LCOV - code coverage report
Current view: top level - g10 - seskey.c (source / functions) Hit Total Coverage
Test: coverage.info Lines: 113 142 79.6 %
Date: 2016-11-29 15:00:56 Functions: 4 4 100.0 %

          Line data    Source code
       1             : /* seskey.c -  make sesssion keys etc.
       2             :  * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
       3             :  *               2006, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
       4             :  *
       5             :  * This file is part of GnuPG.
       6             :  *
       7             :  * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
       8             :  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
       9             :  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
      10             :  * (at your option) any later version.
      11             :  *
      12             :  * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
      13             :  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
      14             :  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
      15             :  * GNU General Public License for more details.
      16             :  *
      17             :  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
      18             :  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
      19             :  */
      20             : 
      21             : #include <config.h>
      22             : #include <stdio.h>
      23             : #include <stdlib.h>
      24             : #include <string.h>
      25             : 
      26             : #include "gpg.h"
      27             : #include "util.h"
      28             : #include "options.h"
      29             : #include "main.h"
      30             : #include "i18n.h"
      31             : 
      32             : 
      33             : /* Generate a new session key in *DEK that is appropriate for the
      34             :  * algorithm DEK->ALGO (i.e., ensure that the key is not weak).
      35             :  *
      36             :  * This function overwrites DEK->KEYLEN, DEK->KEY.  The rest of the
      37             :  * fields are left as is.  */
      38             : void
      39         247 : make_session_key( DEK *dek )
      40             : {
      41             :     gcry_cipher_hd_t chd;
      42             :     int i, rc;
      43             : 
      44         247 :     dek->keylen = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo);
      45             : 
      46         247 :     if (openpgp_cipher_open (&chd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
      47             :                              (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
      48             :                               | (dek->algo >= 100 ?
      49             :                                  0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC))) )
      50           0 :       BUG();
      51         247 :     gcry_randomize (dek->key, dek->keylen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
      52         247 :     for (i=0; i < 16; i++ )
      53             :       {
      54         247 :         rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (chd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
      55         247 :         if (!rc)
      56             :           {
      57         247 :             gcry_cipher_close (chd);
      58         247 :             return;
      59             :           }
      60           0 :         if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY)
      61           0 :           BUG();
      62           0 :         log_info(_("weak key created - retrying\n") );
      63             :         /* Renew the session key until we get a non-weak key. */
      64           0 :         gcry_randomize (dek->key, dek->keylen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
      65             :       }
      66           0 :     log_fatal (_("cannot avoid weak key for symmetric cipher; "
      67             :                  "tried %d times!\n"), i);
      68             : }
      69             : 
      70             : 
      71             : /* Encode the session key stored in DEK as an MPI in preparation to
      72             :  * encrypt it with the public key algorithm OPENPGP_PK_ALGO with a key
      73             :  * whose length (the size of the public key) is NBITS.
      74             :  *
      75             :  * On success, returns an MPI, which the caller must free using
      76             :  * gcry_mpi_release().  */
      77             : gcry_mpi_t
      78         255 : encode_session_key (int openpgp_pk_algo, DEK *dek, unsigned int nbits)
      79             : {
      80         255 :   size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
      81             :   byte *p;
      82             :   byte *frame;
      83             :   int i,n;
      84             :   u16 csum;
      85             :   gcry_mpi_t a;
      86             : 
      87         255 :   if (DBG_CRYPTO)
      88           0 :     log_debug ("encode_session_key: encoding %d byte DEK", dek->keylen);
      89             : 
      90         255 :   csum = 0;
      91        6543 :   for (p = dek->key, i=0; i < dek->keylen; i++)
      92        6288 :     csum += *p++;
      93             : 
      94             :   /* Shortcut for ECDH.  It's padding is minimal to simply make the
      95             :      output be a multiple of 8 bytes.  */
      96         255 :   if (openpgp_pk_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
      97             :     {
      98             :       /* Pad to 8 byte granulatiry; the padding byte is the number of
      99             :        * padded bytes.
     100             :        *
     101             :        * A  DEK(k bytes)  CSUM(2 bytes) 0x 0x 0x 0x ... 0x
     102             :        *                                +---- x times ---+
     103             :        */
     104          48 :       nframe = (( 1 + dek->keylen + 2 /* The value so far is always odd. */
     105          24 :                   + 7 ) & (~7));
     106             : 
     107             :       /* alg+key+csum fit and the size is congruent to 8.  */
     108          24 :       log_assert (!(nframe%8) && nframe > 1 + dek->keylen + 2 );
     109             : 
     110          24 :       frame = xmalloc_secure (nframe);
     111          24 :       n = 0;
     112          24 :       frame[n++] = dek->algo;
     113          24 :       memcpy (frame+n, dek->key, dek->keylen);
     114          24 :       n += dek->keylen;
     115          24 :       frame[n++] = csum >> 8;
     116          24 :       frame[n++] = csum;
     117          24 :       i = nframe - n;         /* Number of padded bytes.  */
     118          24 :       memset (frame+n, i, i); /* Use it as the value of each padded byte.  */
     119          24 :       log_assert (n+i == nframe);
     120             : 
     121          24 :       if (DBG_CRYPTO)
     122           0 :         log_debug ("encode_session_key: "
     123             :                    "[%d] %02x  %02x %02x ...  %02x %02x %02x\n",
     124           0 :                    (int) nframe, frame[0], frame[1], frame[2],
     125           0 :                    frame[nframe-3], frame[nframe-2], frame[nframe-1]);
     126             : 
     127          24 :       if (gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, nframe, &nframe))
     128           0 :         BUG();
     129          24 :       xfree(frame);
     130          24 :       return a;
     131             :     }
     132             : 
     133             :   /* The current limitation is that we can only use a session key
     134             :    * whose length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB
     135             :    * I think we can live with that.
     136             :    */
     137         231 :   if (dek->keylen + 7 > nframe || !nframe)
     138           0 :     log_bug ("can't encode a %d bit key in a %d bits frame\n",
     139           0 :              dek->keylen*8, nbits );
     140             : 
     141             :   /* We encode the session key according to PKCS#1 v1.5 (see section
     142             :    * 13.1.1 of RFC 4880):
     143             :    *
     144             :    *       0  2  RND(i bytes)  0  A  DEK(k bytes)  CSUM(2 bytes)
     145             :    *
     146             :    * (But how can we store the leading 0 - the external representaion
     147             :    *  of MPIs doesn't allow leading zeroes =:-)
     148             :    *
     149             :    * RND are (at least 1) non-zero random bytes.
     150             :    * A   is the cipher algorithm
     151             :    * DEK is the encryption key (session key) length k depends on the
     152             :    *       cipher algorithm (20 is used with blowfish160).
     153             :    * CSUM is the 16 bit checksum over the DEK
     154             :    */
     155             : 
     156         231 :   frame = xmalloc_secure( nframe );
     157         231 :   n = 0;
     158         231 :   frame[n++] = 0;
     159         231 :   frame[n++] = 2;
     160             :   /* The number of random bytes are the number of otherwise unused
     161             :      bytes.  See diagram above.  */
     162         231 :   i = nframe - 6 - dek->keylen;
     163         231 :   log_assert( i > 0 );
     164         231 :   p = gcry_random_bytes_secure (i, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
     165             :   /* Replace zero bytes by new values.  */
     166             :   for (;;)
     167             :     {
     168             :       int j, k;
     169             :       byte *pp;
     170             : 
     171             :       /* Count the zero bytes. */
     172       25890 :       for (j=k=0; j < i; j++ )
     173       25596 :         if (!p[j])
     174          76 :           k++;
     175         294 :       if (!k)
     176         231 :         break; /* Okay: no zero bytes. */
     177          63 :       k += k/128 + 3; /* Better get some more. */
     178          63 :       pp = gcry_random_bytes_secure (k, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
     179        5813 :       for (j=0; j < i && k ;)
     180             :         {
     181        5687 :           if (!p[j])
     182          77 :             p[j] = pp[--k];
     183        5687 :           if (p[j])
     184        5686 :             j++;
     185             :         }
     186          63 :       xfree (pp);
     187          63 :     }
     188         231 :   memcpy (frame+n, p, i);
     189         231 :   xfree (p);
     190         231 :   n += i;
     191         231 :   frame[n++] = 0;
     192         231 :   frame[n++] = dek->algo;
     193         231 :   memcpy (frame+n, dek->key, dek->keylen );
     194         231 :   n += dek->keylen;
     195         231 :   frame[n++] = csum >>8;
     196         231 :   frame[n++] = csum;
     197         231 :   log_assert (n == nframe);
     198         231 :   if (gcry_mpi_scan( &a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, n, &nframe))
     199           0 :     BUG();
     200         231 :   xfree (frame);
     201         231 :   return a;
     202             : }
     203             : 
     204             : 
     205             : static gcry_mpi_t
     206         832 : do_encode_md( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
     207             :               const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
     208             : {
     209         832 :     size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
     210             :     byte *frame;
     211             :     int i,n;
     212             :     gcry_mpi_t a;
     213             : 
     214         832 :     if (len + asnlen + 4  > nframe)
     215             :       {
     216           0 :         log_error ("can't encode a %d bit MD into a %d bits frame, algo=%d\n",
     217             :                    (int)(len*8), (int)nbits, algo);
     218           0 :         return NULL;
     219             :       }
     220             : 
     221             :     /* We encode the MD in this way:
     222             :      *
     223             :      *     0  1 PAD(n bytes)   0  ASN(asnlen bytes)  MD(len bytes)
     224             :      *
     225             :      * PAD consists of FF bytes.
     226             :      */
     227         832 :     frame = gcry_md_is_secure (md)? xmalloc_secure (nframe) : xmalloc (nframe);
     228         832 :     n = 0;
     229         832 :     frame[n++] = 0;
     230         832 :     frame[n++] = 1; /* block type */
     231         832 :     i = nframe - len - asnlen -3 ;
     232         832 :     log_assert( i > 1 );
     233         832 :     memset( frame+n, 0xff, i ); n += i;
     234         832 :     frame[n++] = 0;
     235         832 :     memcpy( frame+n, asn, asnlen ); n += asnlen;
     236         832 :     memcpy( frame+n, gcry_md_read (md, algo), len ); n += len;
     237         832 :     log_assert( n == nframe );
     238             : 
     239         832 :     if (gcry_mpi_scan( &a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, n, &nframe ))
     240           0 :         BUG();
     241         832 :     xfree(frame);
     242             : 
     243             :     /* Note that PGP before version 2.3 encoded the MD as:
     244             :      *
     245             :      *   0   1   MD(16 bytes)   0   PAD(n bytes)   1
     246             :      *
     247             :      * The MD is always 16 bytes here because it's always MD5.  We do
     248             :      * not support pre-v2.3 signatures, but I'm including this comment
     249             :      * so the information is easily found in the future.
     250             :      */
     251             : 
     252         832 :     return a;
     253             : }
     254             : 
     255             : 
     256             : /****************
     257             :  * Encode a message digest into an MPI.
     258             :  * If it's for a DSA signature, make sure that the hash is large
     259             :  * enough to fill up q.  If the hash is too big, take the leftmost
     260             :  * bits.
     261             :  */
     262             : gcry_mpi_t
     263        1192 : encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
     264             : {
     265             :   gcry_mpi_t frame;
     266             :   size_t mdlen;
     267             : 
     268        1192 :   log_assert (hash_algo);
     269        1192 :   log_assert (pk);
     270             : 
     271        1192 :   if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA)
     272             :     {
     273             :       /* EdDSA signs data of arbitrary length.  Thus no special
     274             :          treatment is required.  */
     275          10 :       frame = gcry_mpi_set_opaque_copy (NULL, gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo),
     276          10 :                                         8*gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo));
     277             :     }
     278        1182 :   else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
     279         869 :            || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
     280         350 :     {
     281             :       /* It's a DSA signature, so find out the size of q.  */
     282             : 
     283         350 :       size_t qbits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[1]);
     284             : 
     285             :       /* pkey[1] is Q for ECDSA, which is an uncompressed point,
     286             :          i.e.  04 <x> <y>  */
     287         350 :       if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
     288          37 :         qbits = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbits);
     289             : 
     290             :       /* Make sure it is a multiple of 8 bits. */
     291         350 :       if ((qbits%8))
     292             :         {
     293           0 :           log_error(_("DSA requires the hash length to be a"
     294             :                       " multiple of 8 bits\n"));
     295           0 :           return NULL;
     296             :         }
     297             : 
     298             :       /* Don't allow any q smaller than 160 bits.  This might need a
     299             :          revisit as the DSA2 design firms up, but for now, we don't
     300             :          want someone to issue signatures from a key with a 16-bit q
     301             :          or something like that, which would look correct but allow
     302             :          trivial forgeries.  Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
     303             :          DSA. ;) */
     304         350 :       if (qbits < 160)
     305             :         {
     306           0 :           log_error (_("%s key %s uses an unsafe (%zu bit) hash\n"),
     307           0 :                      openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo),
     308             :                      keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits);
     309           0 :           return NULL;
     310             :         }
     311             : 
     312             : 
     313             :       /* ECDSA 521 is special has it is larger than the largest hash
     314             :          we have (SHA-512).  Thus we chnage the size for further
     315             :          processing to 512.  */
     316         350 :       if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA && qbits > 512)
     317          11 :         qbits = 512;
     318             : 
     319             :       /* Check if we're too short.  Too long is safe as we'll
     320             :          automatically left-truncate.  */
     321         350 :       mdlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo);
     322         350 :       if (mdlen < qbits/8)
     323             :         {
     324           0 :           log_error (_("%s key %s requires a %zu bit or larger hash "
     325             :                        "(hash is %s)\n"),
     326           0 :                      openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo),
     327             :                      keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits,
     328             :                      gcry_md_algo_name (hash_algo));
     329           0 :           return NULL;
     330             :         }
     331             : 
     332             :      /* Note that we do the truncation by passing QBITS/8 as length to
     333             :         mpi_scan.  */
     334         700 :       if (gcry_mpi_scan (&frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
     335         350 :                          gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), qbits/8, NULL))
     336           0 :         BUG();
     337             :     }
     338             :   else
     339             :     {
     340             :       gpg_error_t rc;
     341             :       byte *asn;
     342             :       size_t asnlen;
     343             : 
     344         832 :       rc = gcry_md_algo_info (hash_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ASNOID, NULL, &asnlen);
     345         832 :       if (rc)
     346           0 :         log_fatal ("can't get OID of digest algorithm %d: %s\n",
     347             :                    hash_algo, gpg_strerror (rc));
     348         832 :       asn = xtrymalloc (asnlen);
     349         832 :       if (!asn)
     350           0 :         return NULL;
     351         832 :       if ( gcry_md_algo_info (hash_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ASNOID, asn, &asnlen) )
     352           0 :         BUG();
     353         832 :       frame = do_encode_md (md, hash_algo, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo),
     354             :                             gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[0]), asn, asnlen);
     355         832 :       xfree (asn);
     356             :     }
     357             : 
     358        1192 :   return frame;
     359             : }

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